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Case No 20090958-CA 
In fyt 28taF) Court of Appeals 
Murray City, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
-v-
S. Steven Maese, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Brief of Appellant 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-
103(2)(a) (2009). The Appellant, S. Steven Maese, appeals a GRAMA judicial review. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
POINT I. Under GRAMA, parties have 30 days to seek judicial review of a Records 
Committee order; upon filing a complaint, the review is governed by the Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Here, Murray City appealed a Committee order. Maese filed a counterclaim 
17 days after Murray's complaint, but more than 30 days after the Committee Order. 
The trial court dismissed the counterclaim for lack of jurisdiction. Must counterclaims 
be filed within 30 days of the Committee's order or within 20 days of a complaint? 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW AND PRESERVATION OF ISSUE 
A "district court's interpretation of a statutory provision is a question of law that [this 
Court will] review for correctness/'1 Also, "Interpretation of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure is a question of law that [this Court] review[s] for correctness/'2 
Maese preserved this issue by opposing the Committee's Motion to Dismiss.3 
POINT II. Under GRAMA, the Utah State Records Committee is a necessary party to 
any judicial review from one of its orders. Yet the Committee cannot advocate for its 
decision to be upheld or overturned. Here, the Committee filed a Motion to Dismiss Mr. 
Maese's counterclaim, which the trial court granted. In a judicial review of its decision, 
does the Committee have standing to file motions or pleadings? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW AND PRESERVATION OF ISSUE 
For standing, this Court reviews "legal determinations for correctness, affording defe-
rence for factual determinations that bear upon the question of standing, but minimal 
deference to the district court's application of the facts to the law."4 
Maese preserved this issue by questioning the Committee's standing in his Memo-
randum Opposing the Committee's Motion to Dismiss.5 
1
 State v. Tooele City, 2002 UT 8, t 8,44 P.3d 680. 
2
 Pete v. Youngblood, 2006 UT App 303, 1 7,141 P.3d 629. 
3 R. at 128A. 
4
 Cedar ML EnvtL, Inc. v. Tooele County, 2009 UT 48, % 7, 214 P.3d 95 (quotes omitted). 
5 R. at 128A. 
R U L E S , S T A T U T E S , A N D C O N S T I T U T I O N A L P R O V I S I O N S 
This Court's interpretation of the following rule and statute is important to the issues on 
appeal and their full texts are attached at ADDENDUM A: 
RULES 
• Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(a). 
STATUTES 
• Utah Code Ann. § 63G-2-404. 
S T A T E M E N T OF THE C A S E 
On February 21, 2008 Steven Maese made a GRAMA request of Murray City for copies 
of "All records of sustained discipline of Murray City Police Officers, for which all time 
periods for administrative appeal have expired, for the last 5 years."6 
Murray denied the request. 
On March 4, 2008, Maese appealed the City Attorney's decision to the Murray 
Mayor.7 On April 2, 2008, the Mayor's Office denied Maese's appeal.8 
Maese appealed that decision to the Utah State Records Committee. On June 19, 2008 
the Committee partially granted Maese's appeal.9 | 
On July 11, 2008 Murray petitioned the Third District Court for a de novo judicial re-
view of the Committee's decision.10 On July 28, 2008, Maese filed his Amended Answer 
and Counterclaim.11 
6
 R. at 9. 
7
 Rat 11. 
8
 R. at 12. 
9
 R. at 29. 
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On August 13, 2008, the Committee filed its Motion to Dismiss Defendant Maese's 
Counterclaim.12 On August 18, 2008 Murray joined the Committee's motion.13 
On August 18, 2008, Maese moved the trial court to quash the Committee's motion 
to dismiss because it lacked standing.14 
On December 18, 2008, the trial court issued its Order which granted the Commit-
tee's motion to dismiss "based upon the Court lacking subject matter jurisdiction over 
Mr. Maese's untimely filed appeal, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63G-2~404(l)(a);"15 
In the same order, the Court denied Maese's motion to quash the Committee's mo-
tion; de facto holding it had standing to bring the motion.16 
On October 13, 2009, the trial court entered its final order and commanded Murray 
to release unredacted records to Mr. Maese. Yet it ruled that "The dismissal of Mr. 
Maese's Counterclaim was on the merits, which prevents Mr. Maese from reasserting 
his requests.. ."17 It concluded with "The Court orders plaintiff to disclose the names of 
the officers to Mr. Maese in full. The Court orders Mr. Maese to limit his use of the 
records and names by not publishing them nor disclosing them any further."18 
10
 R. at 1. 
11
 R. at 75. 
12
 R. at 113. 
13
 R. at 144. 
14R.atl28A. 
15
 R. at 3931f2. 
16
 R. at 393 1 3. 
17
 R. at 693-707; R. at 694 specifically. 
18
 R. at 706. 
r«^ A r+*j 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Although disciplinary records are listed under the GRAMA heading " Records that 
must be disclosed," Murray City denied Steven Maese's GRAMA request for access to 
police discipline records twice and attempted to deny him access two additional 
times.19 Despite this, Murray gave Maese discipline records with officer's names re-
dacted. 
Maese appealed Murray's denial to the Utah State Records Committee, which par-
tially granted his appeal and ordered Murray to release its police discipline records 
with the names intact.20 
Unsatisfied with the outcome, Murray petitioned the Third District Court for a judi-
cial review of the Committee's decision.21 Maese counterclaimed and asked the trial 
court for a permanent injunction restraining Murray from violating GRAMA and asked 
for costs and fees—both sanctioned under GRAMA.22 
Yet the Committee filed a motion to dismiss Maese's counterclaim as untimely and 
based on the Committee's motion, the trial court dismissed Maese's counterclaim.23 
Ultimately, the trial court ordered Murray to provide Maese with records which dis-
closed officer names, but held the Maese was barred from asking for witness names be-
19
 Utah Code Ann. § 63G-2-301; R. at 9 and 11. 
20
 R. at 29. 
2 1 R.at l . 
22
 R. at 75; Utah Code Ann. § 63G-2-802. 
23
 R. at 15. 
~ 5 ~ 
cause his counterclaim had been dismissed. Maese never received a permenant injunc-
tion against Murray, nor did he receive costs and fees.24 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I. The trial court held that GRAMA required Maese to file his counterclaim 
within 30 days of the Utah State Records Committee's order. This ruling fails to account 
for Utah Code Ann. § 63G-2-404(5) which states that once a party files a petition for 
judicial review in a GRAMA case, the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure govern all further 
proceedings. Given that, the Rules permitted Maese to file his counterclaims within 20 
days of receiving a complaint. Maese filed his counterclaim 17 days after Murray's 
complaint. Accordingly, Maese timely filed his counterclaim. 
Furthermore the "reluctant litigant" theory— that defendants who take a "wait and 
see" approach to further litigation should not be penalized for trying to avoid a law-
suit—holds that Maese timely filed his counterclaim. 
POINT II. The Utah State Records Committee cannot advocate for either party in a 
judicial review of its decision, not even to uphold its ruling. Therefore, without a pro-
tectable interest in the judicial review of its decisions, the Committee lacks standing to 
file motions or pleadings; it cannot attack parties' claims or defenses. Because the 
Committee is without standing in judicial review of its decisions, its motion to dismiss 
was invalid. This Court should prevent the Committee from filing further pleadings in 
this case and future judicial reviews of the Committee's orders. 
24
 R. at 706. 
~ ^ ~ 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. The Rules of Civil Procedure —not GRAMA—govern counterclaims and 
therefore Maese timely filed his counterclaim. 
Murray City petitioned the trial court for judicial review of the Utah State Records 
Committee's order within 30 days. As permitted under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(a), Maese filed a counterclaim 17 days later. Still, the trial court dismissed Maese's 
counterclaim as untimely under GRAMA.25 
The trial court's ruling was incorrect for two reasons: (1) Once Murray filed its peti-
tion for judicial review the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure governed the matter, allowing 
a party 20 days to file a counterclaim; and (2) analogous precedent holds that Maese 
cannot be penalized for being a reluctant litigant. 
A. The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure govern judicial review of GRAMA ap-
peals. The Rules allowed Maese 20 days to file a counterclaim, and he did so 
within that time. Therefore his counterclaim was timely. 
No statute or court rules allowed the trial court to find Maese's counterclaim untimely. 
Under GRAMA's plain language, Utah Court Rules govern judicial review and permit-
ted Maese to file his counterclaim 17 days after Murray filed its complaint. 
GRAMA requires parties to petition a district court for judicial review of Utah State 
Records Committee order within 30 days of the order.26 Additionally, after a party in-
itiates a judicial review complaint, GRAMA requires " All additional pleadings and pro-
ceedings in the district court are governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure."27 
25
 R. at 393. 
26
 Utah Code Ann. § 63G-2-404(l). 
27
 Utah Code Ann. § 63G-2-404(5). 
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In this case, Murray timely petitioned the trial court for judicial review of the Com-
mittee's order. Maese counterclaimed 17 days later, but more than 30 days after the 
Committee's order. 
In Harley Davidson ofN. Utah v. Workforce Appeals Bd., the Utah Supreme Court stated 
that appellate timeliness requirements exist "in order to bring a measure of finality to 
the orders entered in [] administrative agencies/728 Murray, by filing a complaint for 
judicial review, notified all parties that this matter had not achieved the finality refe-
renced to in Harley Davidson. 
And once Murray filed its petition for judicial review, the Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure governed the action.29 Also, because district courts review GRAMA decisions de 
novo, counterclaims are the only mechanism to invoke causes of action specified by 
GRAMA for district court action —such as attorney's fees and injuctions.30 Therefore, 
Maese's only method of seeking relief against Murray was through a counterclaim. 
Under this statutory scheme, Maese's counterclaim was timely. 
B. GRAMA's 30 day judicial review requirement is a statute of limitations. Un-
der Utah law, counterclaims arising from transactions alleged in complaints 
are not barred by a statute of limitations. Maese'rs counterclaim was timely. 
Under Utah law, counterclaims are immune to a statute of limitations if the counter-
claim arises from the transaction described in the complaint and the counterclaims were 
within the statute of limitations when plaintiff filed the complaint. This holding protects 
28
 Harley Davidson ofN. Utah v. Workforce Appeals Bd., 2005 UT 38, f 9,116 P.3d 349. 
29
 Utah Code Ann. § 63G-2-404(5). 
30
 Utah Code Ann. § 63G-2-802. 
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defendants from plaintiffs who may attempt to game the judicial system and also pro-
tects reluctant litigants bring claims only upon being sued. 
Regarding this doctrine, in Doxey-Layton Co. v. Clark, the Utah Supreme Court held: 
a counterclaim which arises out of the transaction alleged in the complaint and is 
in existence, at the time the complaint is filed, and is not then barred by a statute 
of limitations, will not be barred by the running of the statutory time thereafter. 
The statute will be suspended until the counterclaim is filed.31 
Here, Maese meets the above criteria perfectly: His counterclaim arose from the 
Murray GRAMA matter and it was not barred at the time Murray filed its complaints. 
Beyond the Supreme Court's holdings in Doxey-Layton, this Court in Moffitt v. Ban, 
enumerated sound policy considerations bolstering this holding: 
Doxey-Layton sought to eliminate the possibility that plaintiffs might escape 
counterclaim liability by filing complaints at the eleventh hour of a counter-
claim's limitations period, leaving defendants with insufficient time to assert 
counterclaims before that period expired. 
This Court then explained its "reluctant litigant" theory and why reluctant litigants 
are granted wide latitude: 
.. .[This] allows reluctant litigants to take a "wait and see" attitude in litigation, 
and delay filing their claims until (and unless) the opposing party brings suit. If a 
party files a complaint against a reluctant litigant, the reluctant litigant may then 
assert his or her own right to relief in the form of a counterclaim. However, if the 
other party is also reluctant to bring suit, and does not file a complaint, the reluc-
tant litigant is spared any involvement in litigation—he need not file his own ac-
tion as the only means of preserving his latent claims for relief.... 
The trial court's ruling guts the reluctant litigant theory in GRAMA appeals. It al-
lows governmental entities to wait until the eleventh hour to file a complaint for judicial 
review which would then bar citizens from seeking attorney's fees and injunctions. This 
31
 Doxey-Layton Co. v. Clark, 548 P.2d 902 (Utah 1976). 
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avenue of action has no downside for governmental entities and will become standard 
procedure unless this Court reinstates Maese's counterclaim. 
POINT II. The Utah State Records Committee lacks standing to participate in judi-
cial review of its decision. Therefore, the trial court should not have 
considered the Committee's Motion to Dismiss. 
A. Administrative agencies cannot litigate injudicial reviews of its orders. 
Utah law holds that agencies performing quasi-judicial functions lack standing to par-
ticipate in appeals of their own decisions. 
In Blauer v. Department of Workforce Services, this Court wrote: 
[A]bsent a positive legislative grant of authority to [an agency] to defend its deci-
sions,.. . [An agency] exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions, not being a 
party to its proceedings, and not having any legal interest in maintaining its de-
termination, can neither appeal from a[n]... order of a court reversing the pro-
ceedings nor be heard on appeal.32 
As defined by the Utah Supreme Court in Utah Dep]tofBus. Regulation v. Public Sew. 
Common, the Utah State Records Committee is a quasi-judicial body because it is "one 
involving the exercise of discretion and requiring notice and hearing/733 
Accordingly, the Committee could not be heard in Mr. Maese's appeal. Yet the trial 
court accepted the Committee's motions and improperly granted its motion to dismiss. 
B. The Committee lacks standing in judicial review of its orders under both 
Utah's traditional and alternative standing tests. 
Standing ensures that courts confine themselves resolving disputes most effectively re-
solved through the judicial process.34 In Utah, parties must establish standing either 
through the Traditional test or the Alternative test. 
32
 Blauer v. Department of Workforce Services, 2005 UT App 488,1 25,128 P.3d 1204. 
33
 Utah Dep't of Bus. Regulation v. Public Sew. Commn, 614 P.2d 1242,1253 (Utah 1980). 
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Under the Traditional test, the Committee lacks standing. In Sierra Club v. Sevier 
Power Co., the Utah Supreme Court reiterated the traditional standing test criteria: 
.. .the petitioning party must allege that it has suffered or will"suffer[] some dis-
tinct and palpable injury that gives [it] a personal stake in the outcome of the le-
gal dispute/ ' . . . When determining whether a party has suffered a distinct and 
palpable injury, we engage in a three-step inquiry.... First, the party must assert 
that it has been or will be "adversely affected by the [challenged] actions."... 
Second, the party must allege a causal relationship "between the injury to the 
party, the [challenged] actions and the relief requested."... Third, the relief re-
quested must be "substantially likely to redress the injury claimed."... If the par-
ty can satisfy these three criteria, the party has standing to pursue its claims 
before the courts of this state.35 
And the Committee concedes, in a judicial review of one of its decisions it cannot 
advocate for one litigant over another. In its Answer to Maese's Counterclaim, the 
Committee states that "Neither the granting nor denial of the relief requested by the De-
fendant, Steven Maese, would have an effect on any legal interest of the [Committee]."36 
The Committee's concession ends the test analysis and the Committee is estopped 
from asserting standing on appeal. Furthermore, the Committee is estopped from claim-
ing standing under the alternative test because it has failed to claim alternative standing 
in the trial court. Without standing, the trial court should have ignored the Committee. 
* * * 
Because the Committee lacks standing, the trial court should not have considered its 
motion to dismiss Maese's counterclaim. Maese asks that this Court prohibit the Com-
mittee from filing future pleadings and motions in GRAMA appeals. 
34
 Sierra Club v. Sevier Power Co., 2006 UT 74, f 17,148 P.3d 960. 
35
 Sierra Club v. Sevier Power Co., 2006 UT 74,f19,148 P.3d 960. 
36
 R. at 103. 
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CONCLUSION 
WHEREFORE, Mr. Maese respectfully requests this Court reverse the trial court's dismis-
sal of his counterclaim, reinstating it. He also asks that the Court hold that the Utah 
State Records Committee participation in judicial reviews of its orders is in name only. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on this 27th day of May, 2010. 
S. Steven Maese 
Appellant Pro Se 
CERTIFICATE of SERVICE 
This is to certify that on the 27th day of May, 2010, two true and correct copies of the 
foregoing were served by the method indicated below, and addressed to: 
Andrew M. Morse ^
 H a n d D d 
Snow Christensen & Martineau i—Ur^ ^ .i 
10 Exchange Place 11th Floor g Overnight Mail 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 "—' h 
(801) 521-9000 p 
S Attorney General's Office ^ * * ^ f ™Y 
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor LJ U.S. Mail 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 U Overnight Mail 
(801) 366-0533 p 
(801) 366-0144 f 
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RULE 12 - DEFENSES AND OBJECTIONS 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
(a) When presented. Unless otherwise provided by statute or order of the court, a de-
fendant shall serve an answer within twenty days after the service of the summons and 
complaint is complete within the state and within thirty days after service of the sum-
mons and complaint is complete outside the state. A party served with a pleading stat-
ing a cross-claim shall serve an answer thereto within twenty days after the service. The 
plaintiff shall serve a reply to a counterclaim in the answer within twenty days after 
service of the answer or, if a reply is ordered by the court, within twenty days after ser-
vice of the order, unless the order otherwise directs. The service of a motion under this 
rule alters these periods of time as follows, unless a different time is fixed by order of 
the court, but a motion directed to fewer than all of the claims in a pleading does not af-
fect the time for responding to the remaining claims: 
63G-2-404. JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Title 63G —General Government 
Chapter 2—Government Records Access and Management Act 
Section 404—Judicial review. 
(1) (a) Any party to a proceeding before the records committee may petition for judicial 
review by the district court of the records committee's order. 
(b) The petition shall be filed no later than 30 days after the date of the records 
committee's order. 
(c) The records committee is a necessary party to the petition for judicial review. 
(d) The executive secretary of the records committee shall be served with notice of 
the petition in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(2) (a) A requester may petition for judicial review by the district court of a governmen-
tal entity's determination as specified in Subsection 63G-2-402(l)(b). 
(b) The requester shall file a petition no later than: 
(i) 30 days after the governmental entity has responded to the records request by 
either providing the requested records or denying the request in whole or in 
part; 
(ii) 35 days after the original request if the governmental entity failed to respond 
to the request; or 
(iii) 45 days after the original request for records if: 
(A) the circumstances described in Subsection 63G-2-401(l)(b) occur; and 
(B) the chief administrative officer failed to make a determination under Sec-
tion 63G-2-401. 
(3) The petition for judicial review shall be a complaint governed by the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure and shall contain: 
(a) the petitioner's name and mailing address; 
(b) a copy of the records committee order from which the appeal is taken, if the peti-
tioner brought a prior appeal to the records committee; 
(c) the name and mailing address of the governmental entity that issued the initial 
determination with a copy of that determination; 
(d) a request for relief specifying the type and extent of relief requested; and 
(e) a statement of the reasons why the petitioner is entitled to relief. 
(4) If the appeal is based on the denial of access to a protected record, the court shall al-
low the claimant of business confidentiality to provide to the court the reasons for the 
claim of business confidentiality. 
(5) All additional pleadings and proceedings in the district court are governed by the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(6) The district court may review the disputed records. The review shall be in camera. 
(7) The court shall: 
(a) make its decision de novo, but allow introduction of evidence presented to the 
records committee; 
(b) determine all questions of fact and law without a jury; and 
(c) decide the issue at the earliest practical opportunity. 
(8) (a) The court may, upon consideration and weighing of the various interests and 
public policies pertinent to the classification and disclosure or nondisclosure, order the 
disclosure of information properly classified as private, controlled, or protected if the 
interest favoring access outweighs the interest favoring restriction of access. 
(b) The court shall consider and, where appropriate, limit the requester's use and 
further disclosure of the record in order to protect privacy interests in the case of 
private or controlled records, business confidentiality interests in the case of records 
protected under Subsections 63G-2-305(l) and (2), and privacy interests or the public 
interest in the case of other protected records. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MURRAY CITY, 
Plaintiff, 
S. STEVEN MAESE, and the UTAH 
STATE RECORDS COMM., 
Defendants. 
ORDER 
CASE NO. 080912185 
Judge Michele M. Christiansen 
Pending before this Court are Defendant S. Steven Maese's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Plaintiffs Cross-Motion for Summary Judgement and Mr. Maese's Motion to 
Strike. Mr. Maese filed his Motion for Summary Judgment on July 20, 2009; Defendant, 
the Utah State Records Committee, opposed the motion August 3, 2009; Plaintiff opposed 
the motion in a combined memorandum supporting its own Cross-Motion for Summary 
Judgment on August 4, 2009. Mr. Maese then filed a combined Opposition to Plaintiffs 
Cross-Motion and a Reply in support of his motion on August 5, 2009 and Plaintiff filed a 
Reply in support of its Cross-Motion on August 12, 2009. On August 7, 2009, Mr. Maese 
filed a Motion to Strike Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition, which Plaintiff opposed 
August 10, 2009. The Court having reviewed all relevant pleadings and documents on 
file in this matter, hereby rules as follows. 
I. PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION MEMORANDUM WAS TIMELY 
Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition and in Support of the Cross-Motion was 
timely under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 6 and 7. Weekend days and the Pioneer Day 
Holiday are not considered in calculating the ten days Plaintiff had to file it's opposition 
to the motion for summary judgment. Mr. Maese filed his Motion July 20, 2009, so the 
Memorandum in Opposition was due August 4, 2009, which was the day Plaintiff filed it. 
Mr. Maese's Motion to Strike is DENIED. 
II. DEFENDANT MAESE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
On December 15, 2008, the Court granted Defendant Utah State Records 
Committee's Motion to Dismiss Mr. Maese's Counterclaim as untimely. The 
Counterclaim requested disclosure of the names of witnesses reported in the disciplinary 
records. Mr. Maese's motion for summary judgment again asks for full disclosure of the 
redacted officer and witness names. The dismissal of Mr. Maese's Counterclaim was on 
the merits, which prevents Mr. Maese from reasserting his requests for the witness names. 
Mr. Maese's Motion for Summary Judgment to the extent it requests disclosure of 
the un-redacted names of the witnesses is DENIED. 
Mr. Maese's Motion is GRANTED in part, as it pertains to his request for the 
disclosure of the officers' name, based on the following. 
M. PLAINTIFFS CROSS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
A. An in Camera Review of the Records is Unnecessary to the 
Court's Determination of Whether the Records Should be 
Disclosed. 
Plaintiff has disclosed the records of discipline that Mr. Maese requested, with the 
names of witnesses and the offending officers redacted. Plaintiff claims that the Utah 
Government Records Access and Management Act (GRAMA), specifically Utah Code 
Ann. § 63G-2-404, requires that the Court review the officers names to determine 
whether to disclose them. The Court disagrees with Plaintiffs interpretation of this 
statute, which states in part: 
(6) The district court may review the disputed records. The review shall be 
in camera. 
(8)(a) The court may, upon consideration and weighing of the various 
interests and public policies pertinent to the classification and disclosure or 
nondisclosure, order the disclosure of information properly classified as 
private, controlled, or protected if the interest favoring access outweighs the 
interest favoring restriction of access. 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 63G-2-404(6) & (8)(a) (emphasis added). Plaintiff reads the 
requirement in Section (8)(a) that the Court consider and weigh the pertinent interests and 
policies as necessitating the Court's review of the officers' names. However, the plain 
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language of Section (6) gives the Court the discretion to review the disputed records. See 
State v. Laycock, 2009 UT 53, U 18 (citing Savage v. Utah Youth Village, 2004 UT 102,1j 
18 stating "[w]hen examining a statute, we first look to its plain language/'). Thus, if the 
Court determines a review of the un-redacted records is necessary in its consideration of 
relevant interests and policies then the Court may review them. Conversely, if the Court 
determines it can make the required determination and balance the competing interests 
without reviewing the records, Utah Code Ann. § 63G-2-404(6) authorizes it to do so. 
Not reviewing the officers' names does not render Utah Code Ann. § 63G-2-404 
"meaningless" as Plaintiff assert. A court's determination not to review disputed records 
in no way entitles a court to sidestep the balancing test GRAMA requires, it is simply 
discretionary as to whether reviewing the records would abet that balancing. 
The Court finds that reviewing the officers' names is unnecessary to determine if 
their names should be disclosed to Mr. Maese. The officer's individual names mean 
nothing to the Court nor would it be appropriate for the Court to employ any outside 
knowledge of the officer's names to determine whether disclosure would be appropriate. 
Moreover, Plaintiff has not indicated why all or even one of the officers' names should be 
relevant to the Court's decision. The Court must evaluate the competing interests and 
public policies regarding disclosure, and whether Plaintiff properly classified the records, 
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based on their content, not based on the officer's names or who the officers are. 
The Court also finds that the officers' names are irrelevant to its determination that 
disclosure of the names does not constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal 
privacy. The privacy interests in disciplinary reports are not particular to individual 
officers. The Court sees no reason why the officers' names would or could be relevant to 
its determination as to whether to disclose them to Mr. Maese. Plaintiffs request that the 
Court hold an in camera review of the un-redacted names is DENIED. 
B. Plaintiff has not Met its Burden to Show it Properly Classified 
the Disputed Records as Protected or as Private, 
When Plaintiff received Mr. Maese's request, GRAMA required it to conduct a 
"conscientious and neutral assessment" of his request, "taking into account die entire 
scope of GRAMA, including its expressions of legislative intent, its presumptions 
favoring access, and its mandate that when competing interests fight to a draw, disclosure 
wins." Deseret News Publ Co. v. Salt Lake County, 2008 UT 26, H 24. GRAMA 
prevents a government entity from presuming "that a requested record has been properly 
classified and then proceed[ing] to canvass GRAMA for statutory language that confirms 
its designation." Id. In the case of records of discipline, however, GRAMA provides 
specific classifications and exceptions to their designation as public, private or protected. 
Specifically, GRAMA designates as public "records that would disclose information 
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relating to formal charges or disciplinary actions against a past or present governmental 
entity employee if: (i) the disciplinary action has been completed and all time periods for 
administrative appeal have expired; and (ii) the charges on which the disciplinary action 
was based were sustained/' Utah Code Ann. § 63G-2-301(3)(o). There are exceptions to 
this designation, and where "a record is expressly exempt from disclosure, access may be 
restricted." Id. at 301(3). Utah Code Ann. § 63G-2-305 provides exceptions: 
The following records are protected if properly classified by a governmental 
entity: 
(9) [R]ecords created or maintained for . . . discipline purposes if release of 
the records: 
(a) reasonably could be expected to interfere with investigations 
undertaken for enforcement, discipline, licensing, certification, or 
registration purposes; 
(b) reasonably could be expected to interfere with audits, 
disciplinary, or enforcement proceedings; 
(c) would create a danger of depriving a person of a right to a fair 
trial or impartial hearing; 
(d) reasonably could be expected to disclose the identity of a source 
who is not generally known outside of government and, in the case 
of a record compiled in the course of an investigation, disclose 
information furnished by a source not generally known outside of 
government if disclosure would compromise the source; or 
(e) reasonably could be expected to disclose investigative or audit 
techniques, procedures, policies, or orders not generally known 
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outside of government if disclosure would interfere with 
enforcement or audit efforts. 
(25) records, other than personnel evaluations, that contain a 
personal recommendation concerning an individual if disclosure 
would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, 
or disclosure is not in the public interest. 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 63G-2-305(9)(a) - (e) & 63G-2-305(25). Plaintiff also claims it 
properly classified the records as "private" under Utah Code Ann. § 63G-2-302(2)(d). 
By asserting that these statutes justify its classification of the records as protected 
and as private, Plaintiff must show it performed a conscientious and neutral assessment of 
the records and that 1) it properly classified the records as protected or private; 2) the 
records contain a personal recommendation and 3) disclosure would constitute a clearly 
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy or that disclosure is not in the public interest. 
i. Plaintiff did not Properly Classify the Records as Protected 
Under Utah Code Ann. § 63G-2-305(9). 
The primary problem with Plaintiffs classification of these records as protected is 
that it has disclosed the records themselves with only the names redacted. While this 
might signify the privacy interests of the individual officers are particularly important, it 
undermines any argument that the actual content of the records is private. In fact, 
disclosure of the content of the reports eliminates the need for the Court to consider 
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whether §§ 63G-2-305(9)(a), (b) or (e), as those factors pertain to the content of the 
reports and not to the rights of the particular individuals.1 Utah Code Ann. § 
63G-2-305(9)(d) is also not at issue as the officers' are not sources of information in these 
reports and the Court has ruled that the witnesses' names cannot be disclosed. 
This leaves only Utah Code Ann. § 63G-2-305(9)(c) for the Court to consider; 
whether disclosure "would create a danger of depriving a person of a right to a fair trial or 
impartial hearing." The Court has no evidence disclosure of the names would affect these 
officers' rights to fair trials or impartial hearings. Nor is it clear how such rights could be 
affected by disclosing the names associated with Mr. Maese's request for "[a]U records of 
sustained discipline of Murray City Police Officers, for which all time periods for 
administrative appeal have expired, for the last 5 years." Mr. Maese requested records of 
final disciplinary actions and Plaintiff agrees the officers' right to administrative appeal 
expired for the records it disclosed. The discipline has concluded. Plaintiff has not 
shown any reason why these rights would or could be affected by disclosure of the names 
1
 Plaintiffs only attempt to address the statutory exceptions is the claim that the reports 
are protected because they "address internal investigations and discipline, Murray City 
investigative techniques, and personnel evaluations concerning individuals employed by Murray 
City." Pl/s Mem. Opp. Summ. J. 7-8. Even if the Court found it necessary to consider factors 
(a), (b) or (e), Plaintiffs disclosure of the reports of "internal investigations . . . investigative 
techniques" belies plaintiffs claim that the information itself should be protected. The names of 
officers have no bearing on the investigations or techniques. 
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and disclosure of the names is not prevented by this statute and Plaintiff has not properly 
classified them as protected. 
ii. Plaintiff did not Properly Classify the Records as Protected 
Under Utah Code Ann. §63G-2-305(25), nor as Private 
Under Utah Code Ann. § 63G-2-302(2)(d). 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 63G-2-305(25) and 63G-2-302(2)(d) both allow government 
entities to classify records as private or protected, under different circumstances, if 
disclosure would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-2-305(9)(d) 
To protect records from disclosure under this statute, they must be "records, other 
than personnel evaluations, that contain a personal recommendation concerning an 
individual if disclosure would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal 
privacy, or disclosure is not in the public interest." Utah Code Ann. § 63G-2-305(25). 
Mr. Maese disputes the relevance of this statute to these records and argues because they 
do not contain personal recommendations it does not apply. Plaintiff counters that 
because "the documents constitute investigations into allegations of misconduct, findings, 
recommendations, and imposition of punishment" they meet this exception. 
The Court agrees that the disciplinary records cannot be construed as personal 
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recommendations. The letters detail the infractions each officer committed, the hearing 
process each officer has been through, the consequences of the actions, and each letter 
gives the officer notice that disciplinary actions are cumulative and that the letters will 
become part of the officers' files. There is no recommendation or positive connotation in 
the letters. In stark contrast to a personal recommendation, which is something one seeks 
for praise, not punishment. A "recommendation"is: "[t]he act of recommending; 
[something that recommends, especially a favorable statement concerning character or 
qualifications; [something, such as a course of action, that is recommended." The 
American Heritage Dictionary of the American Language (4th ed. 2009), To evaluate 
someone is "[t]o ascertain or fix the value or worth of; [or t]o examine and judge 
carefully; appraise." Id. 
Plaintiff faults Mr. Maese for not citing law or statute to support his claim, but 
neither "personal recommendation" nor "personnel evaluation" is defined in the Utah 
Code, Utah case law has not addressed the meaning of the words in the GRAMA context, 
nor are the terms ambiguous. The records informing officers of disciplinary action cannot 
be construed as personal recommendations and the exception provided in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63G-2-305(9)(d) is inapplicable to these records. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 63G-2-302(2)(d) 
Records may also be properly classified as private if they are "records containing 
data on individuals the disclosure of which constitutes a clearly unwarranted invasion of 
personal privacy."2 Utah Code Ann. § 63G-2-302(2)(d). This statute is less restrictive 
and clearly encompasses data such as police officers' names. The Court does not defer to 
Plaintiffs classification of these records simply because they contain data. After 
balancing the relevant privacy interests against the public interests warranting disclosure, 
the Court finds that disclosure of the officers' names will not constitute a clearly 
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. 
GRAMA's private and protected classification of records that 'constitute^ 
a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy' does not sanction 
denying access to a record merely because it invades personal privacy. To 
qualify for nonpublic classification a record must not only invade personal 
privacy, it must do so in a 'clearly unwarranted' manner. 
Deseret News, 2008 UT 26, ^ 30 (citing a former version of the statute Utah Code Ann. § 
63-2-302(2)(d); and United States Dep't of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164, 177 (1991)). 
The invasion of privacy is not unwarranted because the officers were disciplined 
2
 The Utah Supreme Court has found that this statute is "a puzzling and circular condition 
to impose on a record, the proper classification of which depends upon whether its disclosure 
constitutes a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. .. .While this statutory language 
remains an enigma to us, we are satisfied that it does not give us cause to defer to the County's 
primary classification of the . . . record." Deseret News, 2008 UT 26, \ 29 n. 5. 
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because of his or her misconduct as a police officer. City police officers are public and 
government officials held to particular standards of conduct and given official duties. 
Officers can be sanctioned for noncompliance with their official duties or standards of 
conduct. It is in the public interest to know when a police officer has abused or violated 
those duties. Even where two officers were off duty, they were disciplined for involving 
a police vehicle in their misconduct and for conduct unbecoming of a police officer. 
Another officer was disciplined for damaging police equipment; another for sleeping on 
duty and others were disciplined for using profane language while on duty or at official 
events. Disclosure of the names associated with the discipline reports will clarify which 
officers committed which infractions in the performance of their official duties. 
Additionally, the privacy interest a police officer has in the disclosure of her or his 
name is far less than the privacy interest an officer has in a birth date, a home address or a 
social security number, which GRAMA protects and which could allow someone to find 
criminal records, commit identity fraud or otherwise infringe on the officer's privacy 
beyond learning about official discipline. See e.g. Utah Code Ann. § 63G-2-302(l)(f) 
(classifying as private "employment records concerning a current or former employee of, 
or applicant for employment with, a governmental entity that would disclose that 
individual's home address, home telephone number, Social Security number, insurance 
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coverage, marital status, or payroll deductions"); and see Scottsdale Unified Sch. Dist. 
No. 48 v. KPNX Broad. Co., 191 Ariz. 297, 302 (Ariz. 1998) (finding "a person, including 
a public school teacher, has a privacy interest in his or her birth date."). Unlike this 
sensitive information, police officers' names are broadcast to the public on a badge on the 
officers' chests. As officials who interact with the public daily, the officers' names are 
essential to their duties. It would be contrived to now prevent the disclosure of their 
names, particularly when disclosure is associated with their official duties. Plaintiffs have 
not established that disclosure would cause more than minor embarrassment about past 
events. Embarrassment does not constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of these 
officers' privacy nor is it justification to prevent disclosure of their names. See Deseret 
News, 2008 UT 26, \ 40. The officers' embarrassment can be limited by controlling the 
disclosure of these names and Mr. Maese's use of them. 
In conclusion, after weighing and balancing the competing interests at stake in the 
disclosure of these officers' names, the Court finds that because of the officers' public 
roles and duties and because Plaintiff has not properly classified the names of the officers 
as protected or as private, that the names are public and Mr. Maese has a right to them as 
a matter of law. Plaintiffs Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED. 
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C. The Court Orders Disclosure of the Names of the Police Officers 
to Defendant S. Steven Maese and Orders Defendant S. Steven 
Maese to Limit His Use of the Names of the Officers, 
The Court orders plaintiff to disclose the names of the officers to Mr. Maese in 
full. The Court orders Mr. Maese to limit his use of the records and names by not 
publishing them nor disclosing them any further. 
This is the final Order of the Court. 
DATED this / \j day of October, 2009. 
BY THE COURT: 
MicheleM. Christiansen^ ^ 
DISTRICT JUDGE r / / 
. ' ' K r C ' 
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